In a recent thread here, posters wondered why a better connection had not been put in at a location sometimes used for detours. The simple answer is that such a connection is expensive for a track that may only be used a few times a year.

Railroad connections involve not only the real estate needed and construction of the tracks but additional signals and the updating of dispatching equipment to reflect these changes. This is already true for connections where both tracks are owned or controlled by the same company but become more complicated if different railroads are involved. And, of course, the new tracks and signals all need to be maintained into the future.

In this post, I’ll try to look at some of the bigger issues related to interconnections of railroads and the possibility of detours.



Though the basic answer as to why a particular connection has not been built may be simple, a related issue is far from simple. And that issue is the resiliency of the American railroad network as a whole.

A few years ago, I wrote an analytical article for the trade magazine HS Today (Homeland Security Today) that looked at railroads’ preparedness for disasters – and which compared the different approaches taken in the U.S. and in Europe.

To me, and I have seen similar conclusions reached by respected analysts in looking at a wider picture, the big difference is that in the U.S., almost all the effort and money goes into prevention of disasters, primarily related to terrorism. In Europe, while there is still strong emphasis on prevention, equal or more emphasis is given to resiliency and preparation for recovery.

In Europe, the attitude is that even with the best efforts, not all disasters (whether man-made or natural) can be prevented. So, when disasters do occur, you need to be ready to deal with them. A non-railroad example is Germany’s disaster response agency THW (which I also wrote about for HS Today), that has a completely different approach from the U.S. FEMA. This is not the place to go into those differences.

One of many railroad-related examples is that European railroads have special tunnel rescue trains based near major tunnels. These trains, which contain a vast array of expensive equipment, ranging from breathing support to medical equipment and cutting tools. These trains may never be used, except for training drills, but they are available, nevertheless.

European railroads, which already have a denser network than found in most parts of North America, also place a high priority on being able to detour traffic. This means that in some cases, the railroads maintain connections between lines, even when they are not normally used or not likely to be used.

Even Germany’s dedicated high-speed ICE lines have frequent interconnections with the regular rail network. For the most part, these connections are used to get work trains onto the dedicated high-speed lines. But, if needed, they can also be used for detours and to get on-rail emergency equipment to the site of any problem.



What’s my point here? As far as I know, very little has been done to seriously assess the resiliency of the U.S. national railroad network. In part, that’s because there are many different companies involved. And, in part, it’s because it’s much easier to offer so called "security theater" – actions that look good but offer very little in the way of real results. I’ve seen plenty of examples of the security theater myself.



If TSA – probably in conjunction with the FRA and AAR – really wanted to look at the security and resiliency of the national railroad network, it would do an exhaustive study that would first look at major route segments, looking at such factors as

--Do these routes carry fuel to power plants
--Are these routes used to carry military equipment to ports for deployment
--Do these routes carry critical chemicals (such as those used for water purification)
--Do these routes carry (or would be able, if needed to carry) significant volumes of passenger traffic

The next step would be to examine the effects of each of these routes being interrupter, either short term or for longer periods of time. Among the questions to be asked here would the availability of detour routes – and how easy these routes would be to access and use. Detour routes would be of limited value if they are already at or near capacity themselves.

Don’t minimize the importance of lines for passenger transportation. Remember the post 9/11 days when the entire national air network was shut down for a time. Passenger trains can also be used to evacuate large numbers of people from an area.



Then, look at how this situation can be improved. Where would additional interconnections between lines make sense in this context? (In addition to looking at where lines cross, also consider additional connections between lines that run parallel in close proximity.)

Finally, put some money into this and invest in the needed additional resiliency of the network.

Yes, America's private railroads have, in the past, been reluctant to take government money for a variety of reasons – another subject I’ve written about in the past. But, this is gradually changing. Lately, railroads have been willing to accept government (state and federal) investment in increasing line capacity for passenger traffic, if, in the end, they come out ahead on infrastructure, which helps them mover their freight more efficiently, too.



The case for investment in the resiliency, in areas where the individual railroads would be unlikely to spend money, can be made without too many problems.

Consider what would happen to the economy if

--Critical power plants started running out of fuel
--Cities were unable to treat drinking water or sewage due to lack of chemicals
--Critical food shipments, such as bulk shipments of grain, could not get to their destinations
--U.S. armed forces were unable to get heavy equipment to appropriate ports
And there are other similar scenarios, which could happen due to a major interruption of the national rail network.

The average person – and even the average Congress person – is probably not aware of these factors, but would probably be able to see a well-laid out case.



The funding to build (across the U.S.) perhaps two or three dozen new interconnections, which could be taken by trains at reasonable speeds, would not be that great in the general scheme of federal spending. Certainly it would be a more useful expenditure than much of the security theater we currently see.

Yes, there are additional steps that could be taken to increase the resiliency of the rail network. But, most of those would cost more money. And, having critical interconnections would be a good place to start.

-- Ernest