> Because the rules say that under signal suspension conditions, method of operation will be
> by TWC-D, as it is in non-signalled (dark) territory. It's a safe way to run trains and is
> the same basic principle as train order operation. That is, IF everyone does their job.
> Sadly, in this case, it appears the CSX crew didn't report the correct switch information to
> the dispatcher before releasing their authority in that area. A cardinal sin in dark
> territory railroading.


Breathtaking!!!

What freakin' idiot rules are those. If - and that is a BIG IF, any special operating arrangements are set up at all during a signal outage, it is usually by bulletin or TO - not the rule book. And any suggestion that suspending the "RULES", to allow high speeds without signals is somehow "a safe way to run trains" is beyond BIZARRE. And what make you think that running trains by "Time Table & Train Orders" without signals, was ever safe? It was not! And it still IS NOT. Neither is TWC or any other variant - without signals

Prior to Dr. Robinson's invention of the closed loop track circuit and the consequent advent of automatic signaling, accidents were legion and the death toll was staggering - in the thousands every year - and tens of thousands in really bad years. Why do you think that greedy private corporations have been spending millions upon millions of otherwise bottom-line-dollars on signalling every year, for well over a century now. For dam good reason!

And yes, where safety and signal systems are concerned; "high speed" means any speed that does not permit a complete stop at a safe braking rate, within one half sight distance; to any obstruction, broken rail, kink, washout, misaligned or unlocked switch, or opposing movement. Feel free to add to that list any other conditions that might present a hazard also. If no warning (red signal) is present, and you can't see it before you must set the brakes - death will follow.

Since 59mph is well above that description, it is not and never will be safe to operate at that speed without a signal or train control system of some sort. That the government allows it under some conditions - such as very light traffic - means very little (note the the line in question here is not a light traffic line). Remember, it is the Gov'mint! - often bought and paid for. Their rules are by nature only a very minimal standard. But we are lucky to have even these minimal standards enacted. When it comes to signaling itself, most railroads voluntarily exceed the minimum safety standards somewhat. That is, as long as Wall Street doesn't notice the expenditure.

Bottom Line: Under the reported circumstance of a signal outage, no train should have been doing anywhere near 59mph. And since over the last decade or so, CSX has had dozens of similar accidents under similar conditions, several involving passenger trains; it is high time the obviously systemic safety problems at CSX be rooted out and fixed. And since the long rash of similar accidents suggests it is likely that CSX is cutting corners somewhere (under pressure from Hedge Fund managers undoubtedly); it is time for a serious independent audit. I say - get on with it FRA. And if any Senator interferes - loudly rat them out to the public.

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As an afterthought - since this accident reportedly involves PTS installation:
IN my 40+ years as a Signal Engineer, including time trying to cutover radio ranging CBTC systems similar to GPS based PTS, I remain baffled by the use of a GPS location measurement technology for PTS, which cannot by itself figure out which track a train is on - which is seriously Critical info.

This inadequacy requires the replacement of every track circuit in America where PTS is to be installed; with coded AF track circuits (existing cab signal technology) to make up that deficit. Trains can then read the track circuit and thus figure out which track it is on - and therefore know which track ephemeris data and signal data set applies to that particular train. Without that input (complete track location), all the PTS radio data in the world is completely meaningless.

Of course, with those AF track circuits installed, a locomotive could just as well directly read the track code, as in any cab signal system, and know directly how fast is safe - dispensing with all the rigamarole, complication, data radio security issues, and foibles of the GPS.
As it is, Amtrak's version (North East Corridor) which predates the PTS mandate, is far superior to that foisted upon the railroads, does not rely on the foibles of GPS and uses cab signalling technology to its max; and it does work.

So now, with the required replacement of the track circuits (where not already up to date), the railroads are replacing nearly everything else too, unnecessarily in my view. All the PTS really needs is the GPS, a data interface to the existing plant, a secure data radio connection to the lead locomotive, an ephemeris to describe track features, and the AF track circuit to be read by the locomotive. For some reason, which my former colleagues seem reticent to talk about, they have thrown in the whole kitchen sink it.

And thus we come to the impetus to put long sections of signaling out of service for extended time periods, just to install PTS related stuff. In my 40+ years, we never had to shut anything down for more than a few hours while installing the requisite electrical interfaces. Trains ran at restricted speed and flagmen were posted at switches and signals; with no more that about 3 miles or so shut down at a time. That was all due to our installation methods designed to minimize impact to train operations.


Of course, it was a more expensive process, but well worth it in terms of minimizing service disruptions in high traffic areas; and minimizing the duration of a signal outages considerably reduced safety exposure. As did the employment of flagmen.

Since the FRA always counted safety incidences that occurred during a signal outage, to be a signal related accident, I wonder if this incident could be considered to be the first two fatalities related to PTS. Mark my words - sadly, there are more to come - during and beyond.