If you include the managers or "officials" at both Veolia and Metrolink, then you've got it about right. I don't care what the computer did, Sanchez was texting just before the trains hit. Let's assume the computer was malfunctioning: the rules would have said Sanchez should contact the dispatcher. He didn't. Even assuming the computer taking over and driving the train up the line, the dispatcher would have had some chance to alert the UP freight and at least get it to stop, mitigating the force of the impact. Didn't happen. The theory that the computer was doing it goes only as far as Sanchez wouldn't have noticed anyhow, because he was texting. (And let's face it, wouldn't the average dude have a kitten at minimum if he's on a locomotive, wants to stop at a red, and HAL the computer won't let him??? Not Sanchez. . .)

Now Conductor Hillenbrand: the rules said the engineer calls all signals to the conductor over the radio; the conductor replies to indications less than clear. It's understood that no signal call took place for the flashing yellow, the yellow, or the red at CP Topanga. This is just fine with Hillenbrand. If he'd contacted Sanchez after the departure from Chatsworth -- er, Bob, how bout the indication at CP Topanga? -- the crash could well have been averted.

But on another forum it was acknowledged that the crews had generally dropped this whole bother of calling signals. This was essentially confirmed when Veolia sent an internal memo right after the Chatsworth tragedy saying c'mon guys, we actually mean it when we say you should call signals -- this is REALLY IMPORTANT. This as good as says the supervisors knew of the problem but hadn't addressed it.

Lots of blame to go around, but yes, they're all employees, if not all brothers and sisters.