On 12-07-2008 - 07:42, John Bruce wrote the following:
It's still very, very hard for me to imagine something like a texting habit developing out of the blue with nobody noticing. The information we have is that Sanchez was texting these guys while on duty, from the cab.
My response:
The Chatsworth wreck is one of the very high prices that’s being paid for the operating characteristic known as “lonesome cab”, i.e., where just one person is in the cab of the locomotive. When there’s just one person up on the cab of the engine, or when, in push mode, he’s operating a cab car with the door closed and the shade drawn, who is there to keep an eye on him and monitor whether or not he’s complying with the rules pertaining to the use of personal wireless electronic devices while on duty? No one. When there are two people in the cab, the second person can give the employee who’s texting or making a personal cell phone call a royal a$$ chewing, or he can grab the cell phone and throw it out the window. What is the violator going to do? Go to Management and say, “Employee Smith owes me a new cell phone, because he tossed the original one when I was violating the rules pertaining to personal cellphone use while on duty.” Yeah, sure.
On 12-06-2008 - 15:09, John Bruce wrote the following:
But if Hillenbrand, the conductor, had expected a call at Topanga -- he was qualified on the route and should have -- and didn't hear it, well, then, he could have contacted Sanchez and maybe woken the guy up before the trains collided.
My response:
Apparently you still don’t get it, John. Even the LA TIMES and the NTSB, among others, are in agreement that the westbound control signal at CP Topanga can be seen from the platform at Chatsworth. So . . . . . . if both Sanchez and Hildenbrand looked up the right of way while the train was sitting at the Chatsworth station, and if both of them saw a clear signal, there would have been no need for them to make any further comments on the radio about signal aspects. Sanchez ran his train as if he had a clear signal. False clears are a lot more prevalent than anyone in the railroad industry (Management, that is) would like you to believe.
Signaling systems are made by human beings. Railroad managements would like everyone (especially the traveling public) to believe that signaling systems work one hundred percent perfectly one hundred percent of the time.
Can you think of anything else, made by man, that meets that threshold?
Check out these webpages. I predict that they will open your eyes and make a believer out of you yet. Keep in mind that what's outlined in the first webpage are REPORTED violations only. Lord only knows how many violations have been covered up or gone unreported.
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www.ironwoodtech.com]
And, lest you think SCRRA / Massachusetts Electric is somehow operating a perfect signal system:
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www.ironwoodtech.com]