Not really "apples and oranges" at all in comparing either Brightline project to the CAHSRA fiasco.

Much of Birghline Florida is being built as a lower speed system, true. But largely to same standards in term of sturctural costs, just with the segments operated on the FEC at 110, because of grade crossings.

The Brithgline Florida 125 "design" choice on the connector to Orlando, is a function of not being worth the additional cost trade offs in marginal capital and operating cost over that distance. Brightline did proper planning, CAHSRA never did> It is the failure to design to any actual realistic "business plan" (despite the tens of millions in planning money spent on the "dozens" of "business plans" I've seen over the last 20 years) which were really just PR stunts not worth the paper they were printed on.

None of this seemingly endless supply of always "new" "business plans" ever really quantified operational costs, nor accurately estimated a fare range, nor any of the other and market factors or tradeoffs between capital and operating costs, and the fare levels.

So nones of these so-called "business plans" have ever realistically identified and/or modeled the expected ranges of passengers, at what fares, on how many runs, from what stations to what stations. And, that was never done in the original alternatives analysis (which would never be accepted for FTA or FHWA projects/and probably get those project sued, if they did what CAHSRA got away with using FRA funds). In fact, it appears that none of this basic work was really done until the 2019 peer review panel modeled it. And, shocker of shockers they also looked at the alternative of linking to ACE, which showed that a longer "slower" "high speed rail trip", serving more highly populated station connection to the end points (Modesto, Merced, Tracy, Livermore), actually would generate as many as 60 percent more riders.

Going from 125 to 225 can actually increase operating and maintenance costs by up to six times (theoretically raising fares cover O&M by six times...) and reducing ridership due to cost. Brightline designed for that "sweet spot" where all of those variable find an optimal combination in order to design a "profit making" HSR line in both Florida and to Las Vegas. The CAHSRA was designed mostly for that "sweet spot" where the most expensive project would line the most contractors pockkets, regardless of any actual optimal public benefit or actual "market" returns for the taxpayers money being spent.

In that way the Brightline projects are "like each other" in having done proper market and cost analysis. Going from 125 to 225 in the US does cost six to eight times on a per mile basis, if the example of the CAHSRA is what we have to go by... Ironically, because of fewer mitigation issues, grade crossings, dozens of news bridges, Brightline to Las Vegas in coming in very close to the Florida project, despite design higher speed. So even comparing Brightline to Las Vegas, with it's higher speeds, the CAHSRA is still an embarrassing gold plated bloated costly taxpayer financed fiasco.