Bill Kuebler wrote:

The engineer had been running over that territory either as a fireman, or as an engineer, since 1916. The fireman had been running over it either as a fireman, or as an engineer, since 1942, the year he was hired as a fireman. Both men had been qualified over that entire territory (Spokane-Paradise) their entire careers.

So it's pretty much established that these men were experienced over the territory in question. After reading some of the other responses, it sounds like maybe weather was a BIG factor. Was it documented in the ICC report what the weather was like that night? Was there dense fog or snow "white out" conditions?

No, the NP did not consider firing or otherwise disciplining the conductor. He was NOT at fault, and everyone knew it. As far as I know, the idea of disciplining any of the three trainmen was never seriously considered.

I don't know what the rules were like in 1962, but, in my opinion at least, the current GCOR and NORAC rule books are written so that charging officers can find **SOMETHING** to charge everyone with, if they feel the situation calls for it. If they can't nail an employee on a specific rule violation, they can nail them on a more generalized rule. Consider the following from GCOR:

Rule 1.47 Duties of Trainmen and Enginemen

The conductor and the engineer are responsible for the safety and protection of their train and observance of the rules. If any conditions are not covered by the rules, they must take every precaution for protection.

D. Other Crew Members Responsibilities

1. To ensure the train is operated safely and rules are observed, other crew members must assume as much responsibility as possible to prevent accidents or rule violations.
2. When the conductor or engineer fails to stop the train, or emergency requires, other crew members must stop the train immediately.

Maybe that last part means the second waiter in the dining car should have pulled the air?????

If the conductor made hundreds of trips over that stretch of railroad, I would imagine that, just prior to the moment of the derailment, he probably thought to himself, "Gee, isn't this the point where we normally slow down for that 30 MPH curve?" And then, like you said, at that point it probably would have been too late.

I think in the case of the head-on coliision at Dalehurst, Alberta between a CN freight and a VIA passenger train (the freight passed a red signal and came out the end of a siding and back out onto the mainline), CN tried to come after the conductor for not dumping the air from where he was on the caboose. Ridiculous, I know, but that's how railroad managements are a lot of times.

It is not the case that both men were "lost." Only one of them was--the fireman. The engineer was distracted, a rather different matter than being "lost," but worse than that, he didn't KNOW that the fireman didn't know where they were. By the time the engineer realized what the fireman had done, it was too late.

I assume that stretch of railroad was equipped with speed boards. If the engineer was distracted by something, I guess we can surmise that the fireman, for whatever reason, didn't notice the speedboard that went by, unless, of course, he couldn't have seen it because of the possible adverse weather-related conditions. If it was a case of pea-soup fog or snow white- out conditions, I guess the engineer should not have relinquished so much "command and control" to his less-experienced fireman.

Northern Snowman wrote:

In a major snow storm at track speed it is very easy to become "lost". If it wasn't for the lights from the gas station it would be nearly impossible to determine where you are at in this picture below. Trust me, I was there and am very familiar with this section of track. I am not saying that was the case though.

I agree. In certain areas of North America, I can see how it could be very easy to become "lost." It must take awhile for engine crews to become qualified in places like the southern states or northern Ontario where you're going mile after mile through a "tree tunnel" --- nothing but trees on both sides of the right-of-way. Fortunately they don't have a lot of sharp curves in those regions of the country!
And I don't think they could pay me enough to operate through pea soup fog or snow white-out conditions on a regular basis, especially in a "lonesome cab" situation where you wouldn't have a second set of eyes and ears to assist you with milepost "call outs" or help in working the fog charts and the stop watch.

Jim700 wrote:

Consider for instance: At 75 MPH you're straining to pick out MP 79 at it flies by the cab side window (because forward sight is a total white-out); fortunately it's on the engineer's side. You check your watch for 10 seconds to elapse and hit the blended brake 'cause you sure don't want to enter "Jack Bland's curve" at the east end of the Lind tangent by surprise. Even in the most dense fog you're able to discern passing under the SR 21 highway underpass but if you've reached that point by missing MP 79 it's already too late and you're unavoidably going to have a Granite Lake - minus the lake - incident. Those double deck Superliners are sure going to be much less forgiving than the NCL's lower heritage cars even if the engine manages to hang onto the rail in the curve.

You have to have every detail of the route burned into your brain ready for instant playback to allow you to visialize the track in front of you even though what you are seeing through the windshield is no different from what an airline pilot sees when flying though clouds. You do lots of things to compensate for the lack of visual input. You're looking at your watch: It's certainly much easier for passenger engineers because you have a well-established running time between any two points of the line you wish to consider. You're feeling the engine lean into curves in one direction or the other. You're watching the speedometer for the slightest change of speed which could indicate a gradient change depending upon how well the currently selected throttle notch was able to maintain a constant speed on unchanging grade.

You know, it's kinda incredulous that, with as much technology as we have today, we're operating passenger trains under the conditions you describe above. Maybe Positive Train Control will go a long way in taking care of some of these issues. We can only hope so. I've heard the system will not only try to prevent collisions, but it will give a constantly updated "picture" of the track ahead (similar to a track chart) and what the engineer can expect, such as sharp curves and even grade crossings.

That "Jack Bland's Curve" you mentioned tells me there's a story as to why it was named such. And think of the number of "close calls" there have been where the train didn't go in the ditch but came close to it. I was on a westbound Desert Wind years ago where we went into a curve so fast between Arden and Sloan, NV that it knocked things off the tables in the diner-lounge. The cars were jerking violently back and forth in a lateral motion as we went around the curve. I guess they were trying to decide if they wanted to tip over. Had they tipped over, there was a large rock-strewn embankment on the outside of the curve. Niiiiiiiiice. And the weather was clear.

Bill Kuebler wrote:

I find it rather fascinating that this discussion is taking place here. Some 49 years after the event, the Granite accident continues to be a subject of interest, mystery, wonder. This makes me think that perhaps all those years of working on this weren't exactly wasted but might have some lasting effect.

Maybe if you contact Vic Neves you can offer your presentation at a future Winterail. I'd sure like to see it. Now, has anyone done some in-depth research on the North Coast Limited wreck on Evaro Hill a few months later in 1962?