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Re: what's the difference between amtrak and BART
Author: ken
Date: 06-24-2017 - 11:32
Some of the Bay Area Rapid Transit System's current coverage area was once served by an electrified streetcar and suburban train system called the Key System. This early 20th-century system once had regular trans-bay traffic across the lower deck of the Bay Bridge. By the mid-1950s, that system had been dismantled in favor of highway travel. A new rapid-transit system was proposed to take the place of the Key System during the late 1940s, and formal planning for it began in the 1950s.[6] Some funding was secured for the BART system in 1959,[7] and construction began a few years later. Passenger service began on September 11, 1972, initially just between MacArthur and Fremont.[8]
The new BART system was hailed as a major step forward in subway technology,[9] although questions were asked concerning the safety of the system[10] and the huge expenditures necessary for the construction of the network.[11] All nine Bay Area counties were involved in the planning and envisioned to be connected by BART.[citation needed]
Train-control failures[edit]
It has been suggested that this article be merged into History of Bay Area Rapid Transit. (Discuss) Proposed since March 2017.
Before the system began revenue service, serious problems in the design and operation of the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system were observed. Three engineers working for BART, Max Blankenzee, Robert Bruder, and Holger Hjortsvang, identified safety problems with the ATC in 1969–1971. BART management was dismissive of their concerns, so the three took the issue to the board of directors. All but two of the directors voted in February 1972 to support management and reject the safety concerns.[12] Management retaliated against the engineers, firing them in March 1972.[13] The IEEE later filed the first amicus curiae brief in its history to support the engineers.[13]
The California Society of Professional Engineers reported to the California State Senate in June 1972 that there were serious safety risks with the ATC.[13] Legislative analyst A. Alan Post, opened an investigation immediately,[13][14] and brought in electrical engineering Professor Bill Wattenburg of the University of California, Berkeley as a consultant.[15]
Train operations were observed by top management:
[BART General Manager] B.R. "Bill" Stokes was showing a visiting transit executive the system's Space Age control system at the Oakland headquarters [on October 2, 1972]. "Watch," Mr. Stokes said. "There is a train headed for the Fremont station." But the moving light on the map moved through the station and went out. The operator called on the radio. "I've just landed in the parking lot!" he said.[16]
An ATC failure caused the train to run off the end of the elevated track and crash to the ground, injuring four people on board,[17] and drawing national and international attention.[18][16] The “Fremont Flyer” led to a comprehensive redesign of the train controls. The California State Public Utilities Commission imposed stringent oversight over train operations, and stationed State inspectors inside BART central control.[14]
The legislative analyst issued the first of three “Post Reports” in November 1972. The report was “sharply critical” of BART,[18] finding that the ATC system was unreliable, the ATC program was mismanaged, and “no solution was in sight.”[17][19] The report accused BART of paying excessive fees for engineering services.[17] BART’s general manager called the indictment of safety in the Post Report “not only disappointing, but deplorable as well.”[18] At the same time, management deemed that the ATC “could not now be trusted to detect one train stalled on the tracks in the path of another going at full speed,” so automatic controls were dropped. Telephone calls were placed manually between stations, instead.[17]
The California State Senate, California Public Utilities Commission, and National Transportation Safety Board launched separate investigations.[20] Several managers were replaced, and the general manager came under fire.[21][22] The legislative analyst reported in March 1974 that BART “suffered from a lack of direction and control on the part of the board and management.”[23] The state legislature held hearings lasting one month in 1974 into the financial mismanagement at BART.[24] Following the hearings, legislative analyst A. Alan Post recommended that the general manager be fired.[24] Legislators also threatened to withhold funding from BART unless the general manager quit,[25] and forced the general manager to resign in May 1974.[25]
State legislators moved to completely replace the appointed board of directors,[26] and passed legislation that led to the election of a new board in 1974.[27] The train-control problems and management turmoil delayed the start of service to San Francisco, from 1973 to 1976.[17][27]
In 1978, engineers Blankenzee, Bruder and Hjortsvang received an ethics award from the IEEE.[28] The “BART Case” is a case study in whistleblowing, used for courses on engineering ethics.[29]
The new BART system was hailed as a major step forward in subway technology,[9] although questions were asked concerning the safety of the system[10] and the huge expenditures necessary for the construction of the network.[11] All nine Bay Area counties were involved in the planning and envisioned to be connected by BART.[citation needed]
Train-control failures[edit]
It has been suggested that this article be merged into History of Bay Area Rapid Transit. (Discuss) Proposed since March 2017.
Before the system began revenue service, serious problems in the design and operation of the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system were observed. Three engineers working for BART, Max Blankenzee, Robert Bruder, and Holger Hjortsvang, identified safety problems with the ATC in 1969–1971. BART management was dismissive of their concerns, so the three took the issue to the board of directors. All but two of the directors voted in February 1972 to support management and reject the safety concerns.[12] Management retaliated against the engineers, firing them in March 1972.[13] The IEEE later filed the first amicus curiae brief in its history to support the engineers.[13]
The California Society of Professional Engineers reported to the California State Senate in June 1972 that there were serious safety risks with the ATC.[13] Legislative analyst A. Alan Post, opened an investigation immediately,[13][14] and brought in electrical engineering Professor Bill Wattenburg of the University of California, Berkeley as a consultant.[15]
Train operations were observed by top management:
[BART General Manager] B.R. "Bill" Stokes was showing a visiting transit executive the system's Space Age control system at the Oakland headquarters [on October 2, 1972]. "Watch," Mr. Stokes said. "There is a train headed for the Fremont station." But the moving light on the map moved through the station and went out. The operator called on the radio. "I've just landed in the parking lot!" he said.[16]
An ATC failure caused the train to run off the end of the elevated track and crash to the ground, injuring four people on board,[17] and drawing national and international attention.[18][16] The “Fremont Flyer” led to a comprehensive redesign of the train controls. The California State Public Utilities Commission imposed stringent oversight over train operations, and stationed State inspectors inside BART central control.[14]
The legislative analyst issued the first of three “Post Reports” in November 1972. The report was “sharply critical” of BART,[18] finding that the ATC system was unreliable, the ATC program was mismanaged, and “no solution was in sight.”[17][19] The report accused BART of paying excessive fees for engineering services.[17] BART’s general manager called the indictment of safety in the Post Report “not only disappointing, but deplorable as well.”[18] At the same time, management deemed that the ATC “could not now be trusted to detect one train stalled on the tracks in the path of another going at full speed,” so automatic controls were dropped. Telephone calls were placed manually between stations, instead.[17]
The California State Senate, California Public Utilities Commission, and National Transportation Safety Board launched separate investigations.[20] Several managers were replaced, and the general manager came under fire.[21][22] The legislative analyst reported in March 1974 that BART “suffered from a lack of direction and control on the part of the board and management.”[23] The state legislature held hearings lasting one month in 1974 into the financial mismanagement at BART.[24] Following the hearings, legislative analyst A. Alan Post recommended that the general manager be fired.[24] Legislators also threatened to withhold funding from BART unless the general manager quit,[25] and forced the general manager to resign in May 1974.[25]
State legislators moved to completely replace the appointed board of directors,[26] and passed legislation that led to the election of a new board in 1974.[27] The train-control problems and management turmoil delayed the start of service to San Francisco, from 1973 to 1976.[17][27]
In 1978, engineers Blankenzee, Bruder and Hjortsvang received an ethics award from the IEEE.[28] The “BART Case” is a case study in whistleblowing, used for courses on engineering ethics.[29]
