The goal was to cover 100% of "operating costs", this is a very narrow set of what used to be referred to as %above the rail" costs, which is somewhat more complex today, including certain "capital" items. Amtrak has been operating within about 95 of this amount the ratio of revenues to operating costs for years, and Congress established the goal with the rail act. Growing Amtrak ridership and ticket sales in certain markets have grown for years, and now "cover" 100% of "operating costs".... Which is some alternative political universe, inhabited the your typically math impaired politicians and news media, is, by such simple minded "logic" is thus deemed to be a "profit".

But, most of the costs associated with capital improvements, including the full depreciation of assets like the NEC (where you're falling apart and being used up faster than your being maintained and upgraded, you are running at a "loss" as the "capital" plant gets "used up".)or the "grants" which have made the capital improvements, that have made this "operating" cost recovery (the more honest thing to call it) possible.

And, so if you really want a "profit" you must account for the cost of capital depreciation and new investments which allow for that increased productivity, to improve service, to attract more riders buying more tickets, generating more cash flow, to begin to recover the costs of depreciation and new investment. Virgin American Trains is operating on that model "full cost" recovery model, and hopefully a profit (although they are also using the well known Japanese private rail development model to generate income from stations, as well).

Given the wide number of ticket sales and passenger miles generated, it would appear that in order to reach the "system wide" 100% cost recovery goal, that I would assume that some routes are generating more income per passenger mile than "average" and some less than "average". And,, that give the market demand variability (due to basic factors like higher population access to service in some corridors), and service cost variability (due to things like economies of scale), that some routes make more than 100%, off setting those that make less... And, I'd really like to see that breakdown...

There may be more opportunities for Brightline level of service and investment that folks had assumed in the US short/mid distance market.