BOB2 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> FUD Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > Amtrak connects now in Toronto and Montreal. So
> > there *is* access. Based on what I've seen
> about
> > it before, a Windsor/Sarnia extension is
> possible
> > if the first phases turn out to be popular.
> >
> > Canada's traditional (at least since the '70s)
> > preference has been strongly for non-train
> > passenger travel. Its traditionally (in recent
> > decades anyway) "conservative" politics (even
> when
> > a "liberal" party is in power) only grudgingly
> > accepts the need for something in the main
> > population corridor (and as close to nothing
> > elsewhere as possible) other than cars and air
> > travel (gee, sound familiar?). This proposal is
> > interesting but only time (more than many of us
> > geezers will be around) will tell how much gets
> > done.
> >
> > As long as they keep it to something
> reasonable,
> > not "must be the fastest and bestest" for
> > political reasons, I'd expect the Canadians to
> do
> > a better job with it than anybody in the US.
> That
> > seems to be happening, with a 300 kph (~180
> mph)
> > speed target similar to Brightline and many
> other
> > HSR systems outside of China.
>
> The 228-mile Brightline HSR project from Rancho
> Cucamonga to Las Vegas is also building "up to"
> 180 mph. segments to achieve 2 hour running time
> "averaging" "just" 114 mph. which is about an hour
> and 20 minutes less than the best legal drive
> time, and about twice as fast as the average peak
> congested drive times these days.
>
> Why? Well because going from 125 mph. to 225 mph.
> can increase construction costs by up to six
> times, and O&M costs by up to 4 times. So,
> Brightline is only building the cheapest 180
> segments to build and operate on (long low
> gradient tangent sections where maintenance and
> O&M costs are much lower). Because Brightline is
> interested in building a "profitable" HSR system
> (both to build and to operate) with profitability
> being one of the best indicators of a "cost
> effectiveness" of any investment. Which is why
> Brightline is not spending an extra $5 billion (in
> private investment/easily twice that in CAHSRA
> gold plated taxpayer dollars), or so, to tunnel
> through the San Andreas fault at Cajon, and will
> simply "slow down" to low as 90 mph. or even down
> to 79 mph. to "power up a 4% grade next to I-15
> and still offer a competitive total travel time at
> an affordable ticket price.
>
> Canada is doing this sort of cost benefit analysis
> in their alternatives analysis process for this
> corridor, unlike has ever been properly done for
> the CAHSRA fiasco. In CA only the fastest most
> expensive train, that could most effectively
> satisfy the need for campaign contributions to the
> politicians promoting the CAHSRA, from those
> contractors who would be wasting the extra
> billions in bloated, gold plated, overdesign, was
> the only real planning criteria which appears to
> have been used. There was no proper analysis of
> nor any real regard for capital, maintenance or
> operating costs, nor any properly modeled
> potential ridership of any real alternatives,
> based on the actual cost to buy a ticket and ride
> it.

Fiscal Impact: State costs of $19.4 billion, assuming 30 years to pay both
principal and interest costs of the bonds. Payments would average about
$647 million per year. When constructed, unknown operation and
maintenance costs, probably over $1 billion annually; at least partially, and
potentially fully, offset by passenger fares.


WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS

A NO vote on this measure
means: The state could
not sell $9.95 billion in general
obligation bonds for these
purposes.


A YES vote on this measure
means: The state could sell
$9.95 billion in general obligation
bonds, to plan and to partially fund
the construction of a high-speed
train system in California, and to
make capital improvements to state
and local rail services.


"Also, due to lots of work by the rail advocacy community, the enabling legislation for Proposition 1A, known as AB 3034 was substantially rewritten before final adoption to include oversight. This includes mechanisms to make sure that there was technical and regional oversight to the project development. In effect, that it is vetted by those regional stakeholders, as a reality check. This will help assure the projects built are not just useless segments that would indeed be boondoggles, but are part of a strategy that integrates with and is mutually supportive of local rail improvements and systems"

Some policy pro.