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Re: Three Step Protection
Author: SP5103
Date: 08-25-2017 - 21:06
> "After the Lac-Mégantic disaster, cutting safety seems like the last thing a CEO would do. I find it unbelievable."
First of all, Lac-Mégantic had nothing to do with anything related to "three-step protection". If I recall, the cause of that particular incident were primarily the failure to properly secure the train, with the contributing factors of the company's choice of the normal layover location (on a hill), general mechanical condition of the locomotives, the use of one person train crew, and their general acceptance of questionable procedures and lack of qualified oversight. Not sure that is exactly what the investigation revealed without rereading it, but that is my takeaway from it.
Any company's safety environment shouldn't just react to a major railroad accident. A company with a good safety culture will watch and learn from the cause of accidents (or near accidents) and be continually reviewing their own situation, and make any prudent adjustments if they discover they have an unreasonable risk.
Just because one company may have instituted a certain specific program or procedure (such as "two step", "three step" or "red zone"), the lack of the same at another company does not mean they are unsafe as they may have an equivalent formal or informal procedure. I worked for years as an engineer before I encountered someone who used the "red zone" procedure. The basic rule has always been very simple - you do NOT move the train unless given a specific signal to do so. Those working the ground always were looking out for the cars to move due to slack adjustment or brakes releasing. If there was any question (especially with more than one person working the ground), I will often double check before moving if I can see the ground persons in the clear, confirm by radio or whistle off with a slight pause before moving. While kicking cars, if anyone called "air" that simply meant they were going to be in between to make up hoses and not to move. Back in the day, if you had an engineer that moved the train without the proper signal, the rest of the crew would soon set things straight. First off, if the engine is standing still, there are hardly any circumstances where the independent (engine) air brakes shouldn't be fully applied. In addition, I just got in the habit during most switching to center the reverser handle while stopped. So in effect I am providing "two step" protection by default. As to the generator field switch, this is pretty much a redundant act if you have in fact "set and centered", however I do turn if off if someone is going to be working on the end of a car adjusting drawbars, changing air hoses, for some reason going under or cutting engines in or out of the consist.
A couple years ago I worked with a laid off conductor who had recently been trained and certified by UP. He would not even break the plane of the car sides, even to reach in to close an angle cock. He also would carefully inspect every set of switch points twice, once before throwing it (if he he had thrown it 5 minutes earlier) and after throwing it. These actions that UP taught him as a standard procedure were far too formal and time consuming in my previous experience and opinion, but since that is what he had been taught and was comfortable with I simply went along with it. Yet he didn't know how to do a gravity drop (which used to be common practice) which we had no option to avoid.
These exact procedures can create a problem by themselves. The greatest example is the use of Track Warrants for main track movement authority. When they became common with the 1985 first edition GCOR, everyone used pretty much the same form and rules for them. As time went by, some variations crept in which usually did not conflict too much between railroads, some lines were added by railroads to the standard form but they did not duplicate the line numbers. I have worked for a shortline that had our own track warrants, and we also had to copy BN and Soo track warrants - all on the same common form. Now most of the railroads have different forms and line numbers, a wider variation in rules, and are extremely picky about repeating them exactly in their specific dispatching format - in part to appease the FRA or NTSB after an accident. For someone working more than one railroad using TWC, it has become a nightmare to remember who does what. And many Class 1s are imposing some of their own safety rules even for the purposes limited to interchange. So how do conflicting procedures promote safety?
It seems today that to many railroad managers are considered "qualified" based primarily on having a college degree with little to no real non-management railroad experience. Not to mention that reduced crews have often resulted in the engineer and conductor having less than one year experience (often finding their certification while eating Cracker Jacks), unlike the old days when at least one person on the crew typically had 10-20 years experience, and an engineer or conductor had at least several years experience before being promoted from fireman or brakeman. The trend, in part pushed by the government, is to create exact formalized procedures into rules that can be enforced to the letter. Much of the current front line railroad management is stretched too thin, and is mandated by the FRA to conduct efficiency testing, and are in part measured on finding violations and taking disciplinary action, versus concentrating on general oversight, supporting safety and mentoring employees. We won't even discuss managers or unions that protect certain employees that are a proven danger to themselves and others.
Accidents cannot be eliminated from railroading or life in general, and are inevitable. We all need to take what reasonable actions we can to eliminate unnecessary risks, and hopefully survive those accidents that can not be reasonably foreseen or prevented, though the only acceptable injury rate is zero. Don't forget that there are too many managers and bureaucrats that are dependent upon creating, recreating/renaming and supporting programs in the name of "safety" that have little or no actual impact, other than create a rules liability for employees and in some cases make simple long established railroad actions too complicated and unsupportable. And yet the railroad industry has yet to adopt some applicable simplified form following the concept of "crew resource management" despite its proven value. But then again, if you are planning on one person train crews with only big brother watching ...
I've worked as a conductor, engineer, trained the same, and been a manager responsible for establishing, teaching and enforcing safety rules and procedures. Regardless of what EHH did or didn't do, I will bet the better employees will continue to use some form of any proven reasonable safety procedure of value even if the company discontinued it. Until there is another bad accident, then there will be yet another mandate for electronic oversight or more pages of regulations that no one can keep up with or sometimes even understand.
First of all, Lac-Mégantic had nothing to do with anything related to "three-step protection". If I recall, the cause of that particular incident were primarily the failure to properly secure the train, with the contributing factors of the company's choice of the normal layover location (on a hill), general mechanical condition of the locomotives, the use of one person train crew, and their general acceptance of questionable procedures and lack of qualified oversight. Not sure that is exactly what the investigation revealed without rereading it, but that is my takeaway from it.
Any company's safety environment shouldn't just react to a major railroad accident. A company with a good safety culture will watch and learn from the cause of accidents (or near accidents) and be continually reviewing their own situation, and make any prudent adjustments if they discover they have an unreasonable risk.
Just because one company may have instituted a certain specific program or procedure (such as "two step", "three step" or "red zone"), the lack of the same at another company does not mean they are unsafe as they may have an equivalent formal or informal procedure. I worked for years as an engineer before I encountered someone who used the "red zone" procedure. The basic rule has always been very simple - you do NOT move the train unless given a specific signal to do so. Those working the ground always were looking out for the cars to move due to slack adjustment or brakes releasing. If there was any question (especially with more than one person working the ground), I will often double check before moving if I can see the ground persons in the clear, confirm by radio or whistle off with a slight pause before moving. While kicking cars, if anyone called "air" that simply meant they were going to be in between to make up hoses and not to move. Back in the day, if you had an engineer that moved the train without the proper signal, the rest of the crew would soon set things straight. First off, if the engine is standing still, there are hardly any circumstances where the independent (engine) air brakes shouldn't be fully applied. In addition, I just got in the habit during most switching to center the reverser handle while stopped. So in effect I am providing "two step" protection by default. As to the generator field switch, this is pretty much a redundant act if you have in fact "set and centered", however I do turn if off if someone is going to be working on the end of a car adjusting drawbars, changing air hoses, for some reason going under or cutting engines in or out of the consist.
A couple years ago I worked with a laid off conductor who had recently been trained and certified by UP. He would not even break the plane of the car sides, even to reach in to close an angle cock. He also would carefully inspect every set of switch points twice, once before throwing it (if he he had thrown it 5 minutes earlier) and after throwing it. These actions that UP taught him as a standard procedure were far too formal and time consuming in my previous experience and opinion, but since that is what he had been taught and was comfortable with I simply went along with it. Yet he didn't know how to do a gravity drop (which used to be common practice) which we had no option to avoid.
These exact procedures can create a problem by themselves. The greatest example is the use of Track Warrants for main track movement authority. When they became common with the 1985 first edition GCOR, everyone used pretty much the same form and rules for them. As time went by, some variations crept in which usually did not conflict too much between railroads, some lines were added by railroads to the standard form but they did not duplicate the line numbers. I have worked for a shortline that had our own track warrants, and we also had to copy BN and Soo track warrants - all on the same common form. Now most of the railroads have different forms and line numbers, a wider variation in rules, and are extremely picky about repeating them exactly in their specific dispatching format - in part to appease the FRA or NTSB after an accident. For someone working more than one railroad using TWC, it has become a nightmare to remember who does what. And many Class 1s are imposing some of their own safety rules even for the purposes limited to interchange. So how do conflicting procedures promote safety?
It seems today that to many railroad managers are considered "qualified" based primarily on having a college degree with little to no real non-management railroad experience. Not to mention that reduced crews have often resulted in the engineer and conductor having less than one year experience (often finding their certification while eating Cracker Jacks), unlike the old days when at least one person on the crew typically had 10-20 years experience, and an engineer or conductor had at least several years experience before being promoted from fireman or brakeman. The trend, in part pushed by the government, is to create exact formalized procedures into rules that can be enforced to the letter. Much of the current front line railroad management is stretched too thin, and is mandated by the FRA to conduct efficiency testing, and are in part measured on finding violations and taking disciplinary action, versus concentrating on general oversight, supporting safety and mentoring employees. We won't even discuss managers or unions that protect certain employees that are a proven danger to themselves and others.
Accidents cannot be eliminated from railroading or life in general, and are inevitable. We all need to take what reasonable actions we can to eliminate unnecessary risks, and hopefully survive those accidents that can not be reasonably foreseen or prevented, though the only acceptable injury rate is zero. Don't forget that there are too many managers and bureaucrats that are dependent upon creating, recreating/renaming and supporting programs in the name of "safety" that have little or no actual impact, other than create a rules liability for employees and in some cases make simple long established railroad actions too complicated and unsupportable. And yet the railroad industry has yet to adopt some applicable simplified form following the concept of "crew resource management" despite its proven value. But then again, if you are planning on one person train crews with only big brother watching ...
I've worked as a conductor, engineer, trained the same, and been a manager responsible for establishing, teaching and enforcing safety rules and procedures. Regardless of what EHH did or didn't do, I will bet the better employees will continue to use some form of any proven reasonable safety procedure of value even if the company discontinued it. Until there is another bad accident, then there will be yet another mandate for electronic oversight or more pages of regulations that no one can keep up with or sometimes even understand.
