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Re: Three Step Protection
Author: Mike
Date: 08-25-2017 - 21:20
SP5103 Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> > "After the Lac-Mégantic disaster, cutting safety
> seems like the last thing a CEO would do. I find
> it unbelievable."
>
> First of all, Lac-Mégantic had nothing to do with
> anything related to "three-step protection". If I
> recall, the cause of that particular incident were
> primarily the failure to properly secure the
> train, with the contributing factors of the
> company's choice of the normal layover location
> (on a hill), general mechanical condition of the
> locomotives, the use of one person train crew, and
> their general acceptance of questionable
> procedures and lack of qualified oversight. Not
> sure that is exactly what the investigation
> revealed without rereading it, but that is my
> takeaway from it.
>
> Any company's safety environment shouldn't just
> react to a major railroad accident. A company with
> a good safety culture will watch and learn from
> the cause of accidents (or near accidents) and be
> continually reviewing their own situation, and
> make any prudent adjustments if they discover they
> have an unreasonable risk.
>
> Just because one company may have instituted a
> certain specific program or procedure (such as
> "two step", "three step" or "red zone"), the lack
> of the same at another company does not mean they
> are unsafe as they may have an equivalent formal
> or informal procedure. I worked for years as an
> engineer before I encountered someone who used the
> "red zone" procedure. The basic rule has always
> been very simple - you do NOT move the train
> unless given a specific signal to do so. Those
> working the ground always were looking out for the
> cars to move due to slack adjustment or brakes
> releasing. If there was any question (especially
> with more than one person working the ground), I
> will often double check before moving if I can see
> the ground persons in the clear, confirm by radio
> or whistle off with a slight pause before moving.
> While kicking cars, if anyone called "air" that
> simply meant they were going to be in between to
> make up hoses and not to move. Back in the day, if
> you had an engineer that moved the train without
> the proper signal, the rest of the crew would soon
> set things straight. First off, if the engine is
> standing still, there are hardly any circumstances
> where the independent (engine) air brakes
> shouldn't be fully applied. In addition, I just
> got in the habit during most switching to center
> the reverser handle while stopped. So in effect I
> am providing "two step" protection by default. As
> to the generator field switch, this is pretty much
> a redundant act if you have in fact "set and
> centered", however I do turn if off if someone is
> going to be working on the end of a car adjusting
> drawbars, changing air hoses, for some reason
> going under or cutting engines in or out of the
> consist.
>
> A couple years ago I worked with a laid off
> conductor who had recently been trained and
> certified by UP. He would not even break the plane
> of the car sides, even to reach in to close an
> angle cock. He also would carefully inspect every
> set of switch points twice, once before throwing
> it (if he he had thrown it 5 minutes earlier) and
> after throwing it. These actions that UP taught
> him as a standard procedure were far too formal
> and time consuming in my previous experience and
> opinion, but since that is what he had been taught
> and was comfortable with I simply went along with
> it. Yet he didn't know how to do a gravity drop
> (which used to be common practice) which we had no
> option to avoid.
>
> These exact procedures can create a problem by
> themselves. The greatest example is the use of
> Track Warrants for main track movement authority.
> When they became common with the 1985 first
> edition GCOR, everyone used pretty much the same
> form and rules for them. As time went by, some
> variations crept in which usually did not conflict
> too much between railroads, some lines were added
> by railroads to the standard form but they did not
> duplicate the line numbers. I have worked for a
> shortline that had our own track warrants, and we
> also had to copy BN and Soo track warrants - all
> on the same common form. Now most of the railroads
> have different forms and line numbers, a wider
> variation in rules, and are extremely picky about
> repeating them exactly in their specific
> dispatching format - in part to appease the FRA or
> NTSB after an accident. For someone working more
> than one railroad using TWC, it has become a
> nightmare to remember who does what. And many
> Class 1s are imposing some of their own safety
> rules even for the purposes limited to
> interchange. So how do conflicting procedures
> promote safety?
>
> It seems today that to many railroad managers are
> considered "qualified" based primarily on having a
> college degree with little to no real
> non-management railroad experience. Not to mention
> that reduced crews have often resulted in the
> engineer and conductor having less than one year
> experience (often finding their certification
> while eating Cracker Jacks), unlike the old days
> when at least one person on the crew typically had
> 10-20 years experience, and an engineer or
> conductor had at least several years experience
> before being promoted from fireman or brakeman.
> The trend, in part pushed by the government, is to
> create exact formalized procedures into rules that
> can be enforced to the letter. Much of the current
> front line railroad management is stretched too
> thin, and is mandated by the FRA to conduct
> efficiency testing, and are in part measured on
> finding violations and taking disciplinary action,
> versus concentrating on general oversight,
> supporting safety and mentoring employees. We
> won't even discuss managers or unions that protect
> certain employees that are a proven danger to
> themselves and others.
>
> Accidents cannot be eliminated from railroading or
> life in general, and are inevitable. We all need
> to take what reasonable actions we can to
> eliminate unnecessary risks, and hopefully survive
> those accidents that can not be reasonably
> foreseen or prevented, though the only acceptable
> injury rate is zero. Don't forget that there are
> too many managers and bureaucrats that are
> dependent upon creating, recreating/renaming and
> supporting programs in the name of "safety" that
> have little or no actual impact, other than create
> a rules liability for employees and in some cases
> make simple long established railroad actions too
> complicated and unsupportable. And yet the
> railroad industry has yet to adopt some applicable
> simplified form following the concept of "crew
> resource management" despite its proven value. But
> then again, if you are planning on one person
> train crews with only big brother watching ...
>
> I've worked as a conductor, engineer, trained the
> same, and been a manager responsible for
> establishing, teaching and enforcing safety rules
> and procedures. Regardless of what EHH did or
> didn't do, I will bet the better employees will
> continue to use some form of any proven reasonable
> safety procedure of value even if the company
> discontinued it. Until there is another bad
> accident, then there will be yet another mandate
> for electronic oversight or more pages of
> regulations that no one can keep up with or
> sometimes even understand.
Well I can see why Richard McClure likedyou. You should have stuck around
So Cal RR. You could have got a fork lift certification and a locomotive washer cert too and made millions washing UP engines.
-------------------------------------------------------
> > "After the Lac-Mégantic disaster, cutting safety
> seems like the last thing a CEO would do. I find
> it unbelievable."
>
> First of all, Lac-Mégantic had nothing to do with
> anything related to "three-step protection". If I
> recall, the cause of that particular incident were
> primarily the failure to properly secure the
> train, with the contributing factors of the
> company's choice of the normal layover location
> (on a hill), general mechanical condition of the
> locomotives, the use of one person train crew, and
> their general acceptance of questionable
> procedures and lack of qualified oversight. Not
> sure that is exactly what the investigation
> revealed without rereading it, but that is my
> takeaway from it.
>
> Any company's safety environment shouldn't just
> react to a major railroad accident. A company with
> a good safety culture will watch and learn from
> the cause of accidents (or near accidents) and be
> continually reviewing their own situation, and
> make any prudent adjustments if they discover they
> have an unreasonable risk.
>
> Just because one company may have instituted a
> certain specific program or procedure (such as
> "two step", "three step" or "red zone"), the lack
> of the same at another company does not mean they
> are unsafe as they may have an equivalent formal
> or informal procedure. I worked for years as an
> engineer before I encountered someone who used the
> "red zone" procedure. The basic rule has always
> been very simple - you do NOT move the train
> unless given a specific signal to do so. Those
> working the ground always were looking out for the
> cars to move due to slack adjustment or brakes
> releasing. If there was any question (especially
> with more than one person working the ground), I
> will often double check before moving if I can see
> the ground persons in the clear, confirm by radio
> or whistle off with a slight pause before moving.
> While kicking cars, if anyone called "air" that
> simply meant they were going to be in between to
> make up hoses and not to move. Back in the day, if
> you had an engineer that moved the train without
> the proper signal, the rest of the crew would soon
> set things straight. First off, if the engine is
> standing still, there are hardly any circumstances
> where the independent (engine) air brakes
> shouldn't be fully applied. In addition, I just
> got in the habit during most switching to center
> the reverser handle while stopped. So in effect I
> am providing "two step" protection by default. As
> to the generator field switch, this is pretty much
> a redundant act if you have in fact "set and
> centered", however I do turn if off if someone is
> going to be working on the end of a car adjusting
> drawbars, changing air hoses, for some reason
> going under or cutting engines in or out of the
> consist.
>
> A couple years ago I worked with a laid off
> conductor who had recently been trained and
> certified by UP. He would not even break the plane
> of the car sides, even to reach in to close an
> angle cock. He also would carefully inspect every
> set of switch points twice, once before throwing
> it (if he he had thrown it 5 minutes earlier) and
> after throwing it. These actions that UP taught
> him as a standard procedure were far too formal
> and time consuming in my previous experience and
> opinion, but since that is what he had been taught
> and was comfortable with I simply went along with
> it. Yet he didn't know how to do a gravity drop
> (which used to be common practice) which we had no
> option to avoid.
>
> These exact procedures can create a problem by
> themselves. The greatest example is the use of
> Track Warrants for main track movement authority.
> When they became common with the 1985 first
> edition GCOR, everyone used pretty much the same
> form and rules for them. As time went by, some
> variations crept in which usually did not conflict
> too much between railroads, some lines were added
> by railroads to the standard form but they did not
> duplicate the line numbers. I have worked for a
> shortline that had our own track warrants, and we
> also had to copy BN and Soo track warrants - all
> on the same common form. Now most of the railroads
> have different forms and line numbers, a wider
> variation in rules, and are extremely picky about
> repeating them exactly in their specific
> dispatching format - in part to appease the FRA or
> NTSB after an accident. For someone working more
> than one railroad using TWC, it has become a
> nightmare to remember who does what. And many
> Class 1s are imposing some of their own safety
> rules even for the purposes limited to
> interchange. So how do conflicting procedures
> promote safety?
>
> It seems today that to many railroad managers are
> considered "qualified" based primarily on having a
> college degree with little to no real
> non-management railroad experience. Not to mention
> that reduced crews have often resulted in the
> engineer and conductor having less than one year
> experience (often finding their certification
> while eating Cracker Jacks), unlike the old days
> when at least one person on the crew typically had
> 10-20 years experience, and an engineer or
> conductor had at least several years experience
> before being promoted from fireman or brakeman.
> The trend, in part pushed by the government, is to
> create exact formalized procedures into rules that
> can be enforced to the letter. Much of the current
> front line railroad management is stretched too
> thin, and is mandated by the FRA to conduct
> efficiency testing, and are in part measured on
> finding violations and taking disciplinary action,
> versus concentrating on general oversight,
> supporting safety and mentoring employees. We
> won't even discuss managers or unions that protect
> certain employees that are a proven danger to
> themselves and others.
>
> Accidents cannot be eliminated from railroading or
> life in general, and are inevitable. We all need
> to take what reasonable actions we can to
> eliminate unnecessary risks, and hopefully survive
> those accidents that can not be reasonably
> foreseen or prevented, though the only acceptable
> injury rate is zero. Don't forget that there are
> too many managers and bureaucrats that are
> dependent upon creating, recreating/renaming and
> supporting programs in the name of "safety" that
> have little or no actual impact, other than create
> a rules liability for employees and in some cases
> make simple long established railroad actions too
> complicated and unsupportable. And yet the
> railroad industry has yet to adopt some applicable
> simplified form following the concept of "crew
> resource management" despite its proven value. But
> then again, if you are planning on one person
> train crews with only big brother watching ...
>
> I've worked as a conductor, engineer, trained the
> same, and been a manager responsible for
> establishing, teaching and enforcing safety rules
> and procedures. Regardless of what EHH did or
> didn't do, I will bet the better employees will
> continue to use some form of any proven reasonable
> safety procedure of value even if the company
> discontinued it. Until there is another bad
> accident, then there will be yet another mandate
> for electronic oversight or more pages of
> regulations that no one can keep up with or
> sometimes even understand.
Well I can see why Richard McClure likedyou. You should have stuck around
So Cal RR. You could have got a fork lift certification and a locomotive washer cert too and made millions washing UP engines.
