Well, with that admission, - - -

- - - comes the solemn responsibility to do something to prevent future occurrences. There have been way too many incidences in Southern California, so something must be done - and now. But what? These incidences have been varied and diverse. So no one solution exists. But - Some thoughts at least:

Appalling as it may seem, one agency I have been involved with professionally, did actually express concern about the professionalism of their onboard crews, compared to that found in the freight railroads. (it wasn't Metrolink)

Obviously, all causes of unprofessionalism and potential human failure must be dealt with. Things such a poor training, low expectations, cavalier attitudes, and less than perfect compliance with safety rules, are things that can be corrected by improved management vigilance and determination, without a lot money being spent.

One accident investigation I was involved with at the technical level, uncovered chronic serious speed compliance problems, which upper management was previously unaware of. Even evidence of pressure from dispatchers to hurry things along was uncovered. Of course the stinky stuff hit the proverbial fan in a huge hurry. The last I heard, their then chief dispatcher was selling shoes for a living! And yes, the on board crew was fired as well. But all those other violations should have been disciplined as well - at least with remedial training. I have no reason to believe that is the case here, but increased management vigilance is always the obvious first step.

But even with high professionalism levels, increased management vigilance cannot do much to prevent the simple innocent human error that we all are prone to - in the blink of an eye. Thus either two enginemen in the cab checking each other, or else cab signals equipped with automatic train stop, are an absolute must - period.

However, the introduction of mechanical or electrical devices to back up a solitary engineman presents a new potential hazard - that of cold unfeeling machine error, complete with the same disastrous results we've seen here. Someone mentioned PTS and GPS a ways back. But having been extensively involved in experimental projects in radio based technologies such as these (there are numerous proposals), I can tell you they are no where near ready for prime time. No one as yet, has found ways to mitigate various unsafe failures or circumstances they are prone to. And some of them are so cumbersome to operate, that errors can creep in that way as well.

Radio based technologies can help in situations where no other method of backing up the human exists, such as work limit enforcement, or dark territory protection against lap orders and open switches. But total reliance on them is still risky. Moreover, because of the very high costs involved, the rail industry as a whole is extremely reluctant. One agency alone has spent over a hundred million of A.R.P.A. money and still can't get it to work - and so abandoned the effort. Moreover, The A.A.R. is resisting any imposed regulatory mandates. Though concerned, even the F.R.A. is reticent.

But we need not wait. The F.R.A. can act now to mandate use of automatic train protection by passenger trains, and eventually by all traffic. Effective, reliable, and safe technology has already existed since the thirties, and has become very refined and totally micro-processor based. I am not referring to the Sante Fe's ATS track magnet system or to tripper arms as used by NYCTA. but instead, to a fully capable modern system, featuring the use of coded track circuits with on-board cab signals and signal aspect enforcement.

The whole Northeast Corridor and much other trackage in the northeast is already covered, as are parts of the old UP and C&NW. The key system had it on the bridge, Muni used it under Market street and Twin Peaks, Salt Lake City's new commuter system has already installed it, as has some others. CTA in Chicago used older versions of it for years. Virtually all the newer rapid transit system were built with it - even BART (BART took it one step further even, entirely automating speed controls). Now CalTrain has already finished installing its foundation and is moving forward with it.

Its foundation is the electronically coded track circuit; which virtually every CTC system installed in the last 50 years already uses, and has been retrofitted almost everywhere. It is absolutely proven technology, and is already ubiquitous throughout the United States. You would be hard pressed to even buy a track circuit that isn't already coded.

So what is the problem? A half century ago, the F.R.A. mandated some sort of ATC system where speeds exceed 79mph. So most of those glorious private enterprises took that to mean that where speeds are lower it wasn't necessary to use; and like any business, decided they weren't going to do it if they didn't have to. Many systems were yanked out and speeds lowered everywhere. (They should have set the speed at 39mph!) Since that time, all these modern coded track circuits were put in, but not configured with cab signals in mind. They could have been so configured for little extra cost at installation time. But that would have been out of the box thinking.

Any effort to reconfigure existing track hardware will require time and some materials, but in most locations, not a lot of new equipment, if any will be needed. Many (if not most) Amtrak locomotives are already equipped. Mostly, all that is required is a relatively big will to just do it - and a relatively small to moderate amount of money. Certainly less than a couple of hundred million dollar passenger train wreaks - No to mention the lives saved.

I for one, am willing to expend tax dollars to see it happen for Amtrak and other passenger trains. The private freight railroads can fend for themselves - even if mandated, as the cost of safety is just the cost of doing business.

OPB