The world is full of hate. Has been ever since Cain slew Able. But no human I know, has a ghost of a chance to fix that!

However, "Damn Scab" is a common epithet, often cast about by union members and their sympathizers during labor strife. In the deep anguish, frustration, and pain of a strike action, its use is more of an expression of these, than it is of hate. But if we are to label anything as hate, we should be careful that our labeling will not ensnare our own selves in our own judgement.


At least one of them could have been a "scab", as the union might call them. Were they "damned"? Arguably, and sadly, they were - they're dead now!

But the more pertinent questions at this point are; What factors led to this accident? And, since this keeps happening at BART (and also many many nears misses I am aware of), there must be something systemically wrong - What is it? How can it be fixed?

It is a good thing that the CPUC has finally (after years of such) called in the FEDS to investigate. Hopefully, they can find the straight answers that despite their dedication to and concern about safety, BART management has been too narrow minded to see, ever since their 1972 opening.

First, we know that one of the individuals was an "experienced railroad contractor" and the other an experienced BART employee. However, from what I could gather, neither had recent experience with in-service BART trackage. Indeed, the outside contractor's primary experience was with more conventional railroad rules - not BART's oddball, non industry standard ones.

Second, even if they were working under "work orders" of some sort, which would have allowed them to encroach upon the track envelope and perform actual work, absolute control of the track still IS NOT transferred to anyone on site. Those at the control center retain that. They could still operate a train through the area at any speed on any track in any direction, solely at their own discretion (or indiscretion). That alone makes the railroad contractor NOT experienced with the real world conditions he was confronted with.

At best, the "non-rep" BART employee, though experienced in the past, would have been rusty at in service wayside safety procedures, such as they are. Which may account for why the "Simple Approval" procedures they were actually operating under, were obviously not followed.

Obvious because they were separated by as much as 150 yards. At that distance, the "lookout" could not communicate directly with the one doing the inspection. Under "simple approval", one of each group on wayside is required to be a full time lookout, doing absolutely no other duty; and must have clear visibility of at least 15 seconds running time in both directions (1540ft at this location) before allowing anyone to work. These were not so grouped!

Moreover, the only point in separating themselves so far would be for each to be doing their own inspection work; leaving no one to be the lookout! While they both were railroad experienced in general; that they both lacked (or had lost) the needed experience specific to their actual circumstance; is glaringly evident.

They should not have been put in this situation in the first place. Not only that, since this was an "Extra" movement, there was no need whatsoever, to operate that train through a work area at all. It could have waited a few minutes, if the track inspection was deemed so important that it couldn't have waited.

Most glaring of all: if the track inspection was so critical that it could not have waited for that one train in hours, they would have had no business operating any train at all over such suspicious track! Especially at speed!

Despite my recent concerns about the loss of objectivity of the NTSB; I am glad they will be investigating. The CPUC does not have the needed expertise, and much of top management remains myopic. I have good friends working there still. I don't want them hurt too.

OPB