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Re: 1962 North Coast Limited Wreck At Granite Lake, ID
Author: Bill Kuebler
Date: 03-06-2011 - 09:49
Responding to questions raised by Holly Gibson:
Weather is an important part of the Granite story, but it was not the cause of the accident. Here's a quick rundown of the weather:
28 degrees F
10:18 p.m., so dark, with no moonlight. (A 15% waning crescent moon rose above the horizon later that evening, around 4 a.m., long after the accident. So no moonlight.)
Several inches of newly fallen, loose snow, lay on the ground, atop a lower layer of semi-loose snow from previous snowfalls. About four inches had fallen in the Granite vacinity that evening by the time of the accident. It was by no means a blizzard. Visibility for the ENGINE CREW was not bad at all--more than enough to allow them to maintain situational awareness. But...the loose snow swirled up and about the cars, thus preventing rear brakeman Gerry Jones from doing a visual inspection of the train on a slight right-hand curve between siding switches at Granite. At that moment, he was in the rear car's vestibule attempting an observation of his train, but to no avail. He got a face-full of snow. BUT....his presence there allowed him to hear the Nathan P-3 air chime blowing for a grade crossing. That grade crossing was about 700 feet east of the curve on which they derailed. THIS is very telling. The fireman knew enough to blow the whistle for a grade crossing, but I maintain it was only because he saw the "W" whistle post, and was just mindlessly blowing the whistle and completely oblivious to the upcoming curve. He had lost situational awareness.
Regarding "speed boards" -- and the correct nomenclature for these on the NP was "reduce speed signs" and "advance warning reduce speed signs." Yes, there were such signs posted, and yes, they were clearly visible, even in the snowfall. The reduce speed sign, with a "30" posted, was located right at the east end of the 8-degree curve just west of Granite siding. The advance warning speed signs in those days were required by rule (Consolidated Code for NP signage) to be located 3,000 feet in advance of the reduce speed sign. At Granite, the advance warning sign was located exactly 3,076 feet east of the reduce speed sign. But...on a 75-MPH passenger train, if you wait until you see the advance warning sign to set the air for the curve, it's too late. WAY too late. Almost everyone with any savvy on that district knew this, including the engineer. At Granite, at 75 MPH with train No. 25, you had to have complete the SECOND of two brakepipe reductions (split application, standard NP practice at that time) by the time you passed the east siding switch, which was quite some ways east of the advance warning sign. Bottom line: on that train and at that speed, the air had to be set based on situational awareness, not on signs. Also, keep in mind that the North Coast Limited, in particular, of that day required slightly longer stopping and slow-down distances as compared with, say, the Mainstreeter--even if the number of cars and tonnage were the same. This is due to the NCL's disc brakes, decelostats, and anti-wheel slide system. Steel-toed winter brake shoes helped offset this disadvantage, but not completely. Anyway, the air on that train had to be set by the east switch....or else.
There was a brake application made as the train approached the east switch. The conductor was sitting in the dining car and felt it. BUT...right after the brake application, the brakes were RELEASED (!!) and no significant slow-down occurred! No further brake application was made prior to derailment.
As for railroad management "wanting" to "hang" a crew member....you're right that today's railroad managements are like that. If they want to, they can find "something" to cite. But yesterday's railroad managements were not like today's. People in our society were different then. This is NOT to say that such shenanigans never occured in 1962. They did. Indeed, some NP officials tried to hang the Road Foreman of Engines at Parkwater for this accident. But he was able to think on his feet, and he CORRECTLY defended himself and actually reversed their accusations on themselves, and effectively blamed THEM and THEIR supervision for being just as culpable as anyone else's could have been. He was right. But more than that, they KNEW he was right. And because they had some integrity, they didn't fire him and, instead, took a good long look in the mirror and realized that they, too, were sinners who needed to straighten up their act.
This would be unheard of today. It's a different day an age now. Today's leaders, for the most part, lack integrity and NEVER admit mistakes. They will go to hell insisting that they could do no wrong. Pity them.
This is why Conductor Walt St. Clair was not accused of anything. NP management involved had enough integrity to avoid that mistake.
For reasons like that, if I could go back to the 1940s, 50s, etc., I'd do it in a heartbeat. It would be a breath of fresh air from today's stinking environment.
If others don't share my opinion on this, fine. But that's how I see it.
Bill Kuebler
Weather is an important part of the Granite story, but it was not the cause of the accident. Here's a quick rundown of the weather:
28 degrees F
10:18 p.m., so dark, with no moonlight. (A 15% waning crescent moon rose above the horizon later that evening, around 4 a.m., long after the accident. So no moonlight.)
Several inches of newly fallen, loose snow, lay on the ground, atop a lower layer of semi-loose snow from previous snowfalls. About four inches had fallen in the Granite vacinity that evening by the time of the accident. It was by no means a blizzard. Visibility for the ENGINE CREW was not bad at all--more than enough to allow them to maintain situational awareness. But...the loose snow swirled up and about the cars, thus preventing rear brakeman Gerry Jones from doing a visual inspection of the train on a slight right-hand curve between siding switches at Granite. At that moment, he was in the rear car's vestibule attempting an observation of his train, but to no avail. He got a face-full of snow. BUT....his presence there allowed him to hear the Nathan P-3 air chime blowing for a grade crossing. That grade crossing was about 700 feet east of the curve on which they derailed. THIS is very telling. The fireman knew enough to blow the whistle for a grade crossing, but I maintain it was only because he saw the "W" whistle post, and was just mindlessly blowing the whistle and completely oblivious to the upcoming curve. He had lost situational awareness.
Regarding "speed boards" -- and the correct nomenclature for these on the NP was "reduce speed signs" and "advance warning reduce speed signs." Yes, there were such signs posted, and yes, they were clearly visible, even in the snowfall. The reduce speed sign, with a "30" posted, was located right at the east end of the 8-degree curve just west of Granite siding. The advance warning speed signs in those days were required by rule (Consolidated Code for NP signage) to be located 3,000 feet in advance of the reduce speed sign. At Granite, the advance warning sign was located exactly 3,076 feet east of the reduce speed sign. But...on a 75-MPH passenger train, if you wait until you see the advance warning sign to set the air for the curve, it's too late. WAY too late. Almost everyone with any savvy on that district knew this, including the engineer. At Granite, at 75 MPH with train No. 25, you had to have complete the SECOND of two brakepipe reductions (split application, standard NP practice at that time) by the time you passed the east siding switch, which was quite some ways east of the advance warning sign. Bottom line: on that train and at that speed, the air had to be set based on situational awareness, not on signs. Also, keep in mind that the North Coast Limited, in particular, of that day required slightly longer stopping and slow-down distances as compared with, say, the Mainstreeter--even if the number of cars and tonnage were the same. This is due to the NCL's disc brakes, decelostats, and anti-wheel slide system. Steel-toed winter brake shoes helped offset this disadvantage, but not completely. Anyway, the air on that train had to be set by the east switch....or else.
There was a brake application made as the train approached the east switch. The conductor was sitting in the dining car and felt it. BUT...right after the brake application, the brakes were RELEASED (!!) and no significant slow-down occurred! No further brake application was made prior to derailment.
As for railroad management "wanting" to "hang" a crew member....you're right that today's railroad managements are like that. If they want to, they can find "something" to cite. But yesterday's railroad managements were not like today's. People in our society were different then. This is NOT to say that such shenanigans never occured in 1962. They did. Indeed, some NP officials tried to hang the Road Foreman of Engines at Parkwater for this accident. But he was able to think on his feet, and he CORRECTLY defended himself and actually reversed their accusations on themselves, and effectively blamed THEM and THEIR supervision for being just as culpable as anyone else's could have been. He was right. But more than that, they KNEW he was right. And because they had some integrity, they didn't fire him and, instead, took a good long look in the mirror and realized that they, too, were sinners who needed to straighten up their act.
This would be unheard of today. It's a different day an age now. Today's leaders, for the most part, lack integrity and NEVER admit mistakes. They will go to hell insisting that they could do no wrong. Pity them.
This is why Conductor Walt St. Clair was not accused of anything. NP management involved had enough integrity to avoid that mistake.
For reasons like that, if I could go back to the 1940s, 50s, etc., I'd do it in a heartbeat. It would be a breath of fresh air from today's stinking environment.
If others don't share my opinion on this, fine. But that's how I see it.
Bill Kuebler
