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Re: UP to begin installing inward-facing Cab Cams
Author: OPRRMS
Date: 08-25-2013 - 13:41
OTN Wrote:
-------------------------------------------------------
> Dr Zarkoff Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > He kept writing his columns until the mid
> 1990s,
> > well after the Rubber Rooms came and went.
> Never
> > heard about the Yuma business.
>
> Refresh your memory with a review of DOT NTSB
> Accident Report at Yuma,AZ July 15, 1987 and maybe
> all of you anti testing employees will get a
> better Idea of the orign of some of the "Hen
> House" efficiency tests RR supervisiors by law
> are required to perform.
Efficiency testing was in effect long before this incident, and did nothing to prevent it.
> This is a shining example of why management can
> not trust employees to police them seles.
The report you've cited clearly states, based on information provided to the Board by SP, that the railroad had reduced the number of Operating Department management at Yuma a couple of years prior to this incident, and that only a Trainmaster and Road Foreman of Engines were assigned there. Yuma-based crews had been involved in two prior fatal collisions where the same root cause was present. So is it your contention that had SP had a greater number of company officers assigned to Yuma, this incident would've been avoided? If so, your beef should be with the railroad not the crews.
-------------------------------------------------------
> Dr Zarkoff Wrote:
> --------------------------------------------------
> -----
> > He kept writing his columns until the mid
> 1990s,
> > well after the Rubber Rooms came and went.
> Never
> > heard about the Yuma business.
>
> Refresh your memory with a review of DOT NTSB
> Accident Report at Yuma,AZ July 15, 1987 and maybe
> all of you anti testing employees will get a
> better Idea of the orign of some of the "Hen
> House" efficiency tests RR supervisiors by law
> are required to perform.
Efficiency testing was in effect long before this incident, and did nothing to prevent it.
> This is a shining example of why management can
> not trust employees to police them seles.
The report you've cited clearly states, based on information provided to the Board by SP, that the railroad had reduced the number of Operating Department management at Yuma a couple of years prior to this incident, and that only a Trainmaster and Road Foreman of Engines were assigned there. Yuma-based crews had been involved in two prior fatal collisions where the same root cause was present. So is it your contention that had SP had a greater number of company officers assigned to Yuma, this incident would've been avoided? If so, your beef should be with the railroad not the crews.
