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Re: Would container traffic have saved the Milwaukee Road?
Author: Mark Meyer
Date: 04-06-2013 - 07:43
This "what if" question is part of the prevailing Milwaukee Road "Chicken-or-Egg" question. Did the Milwaukee Road go away because its inferior route or would its inferior route make it unable to compete in today's world of heavy stack trains (both eastbound and westbound) and heavier unit trains? Of course, there are people that believe the Milwaukee went away for other reasons, but the reality of railroading is, just about everywhere, that the strong route survives. Even if you are incompetently managed or part of conspiracy to do you in, if your route is that strong, someone will step in and run it because in the long run the efficiencies will make you money. Case in point: Rock Island's Golden State and Kansas City-Twin Cities routes in 1980. Both in bad shape. Both too good to pass up. Today these routes pay big dividends to UP as the low cost route in these corridors. But no one stepped in to take the west end of the Milwaukee. The route over Snoqualmie Pass should have been saved (it was, but then BN in the 1980s dumped it), but other than that, nothing worth saving, so it wasn't.
.
When "SGB" says "it's (its) faster route (referencing the Milwaukee) would have been hard to beat," one really has to wonder, as there has never been any proof of this, but it is an oft-touted myth of Milwaukee superiority (again, please ask yourself if the route really was superior, why didn't someone snatch it up?).
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During 1973, the timeframe when the Milwaukee was said to be the most competitive with BN, an Official Guide shows Milwaukee train 261(the hottest westbound) making the run from Chicago to Seattle in 59 hours. A connection provided service from Chicago to Portland in 74 hours. Meanwhile in the same Official Guide, BN 97 offers Chicago-Seattle service in 51.5 hours, some 7.5 hours faster than Milwaukee 261, and train 197 shows a Chicago-Portland timing of 56.5 hours. At the same time, however, BN was running the TOFC “Pacific Zip” (successor to the Fast Mail/Western Star) on a schedule that routinely made running time similar to that of the “Empire Builder” passenger train (from Chicago to Seattle) in the vicinity of 45 hours, that much faster than the Milwaukee.
There is also evidence that the Milwaukee’s much-touted Pacific Northwest service really didn’t run as advertised. In August 1972, train 261 was carded for 66 hours from Chicago to Tacoma, but its average running time was 72 hours; train 262 going the opposite way was allowed 73 hours, but averaged 85.5.(http://milwaukeeroadarchives.com/EconomicStudies/1972AveragePerformanceNo261.pdf)
There is little reason to believe the Milwaukee could ever be faster handling stack trains. In 1972, over 90 percent of BN's "transcontinental" route was CTC or double track; The Milwaukee had no double track west of the Twin Cities, and what little CTC there was was “poor man’s CTC” in that there were no power switches. The Milwaukee main line between Plummer, Idaho and Marengo, Washington wasn’t ever even equipped with Automatic Block Signals – a shocking omission on a “mainline” railroad. In 1972, most sidings on the BN "transcontinental" route could handle 7,000-foot trains (as these stack trains would turn out to be); the Milwaukee had few and only four such locations between St. Maries, Idaho and Seattle/Tacoma. By the end, the Milwaukee Western Extension was what it always was, a long branch line without power switches, trackside equipment detectors, and a mostly train-order operation, with signaling and siding capacity incapable to handling the larger trains of the future. This is in contrast to the BN with most sidings already able to handle train sizes of today, and mostly CTC or double track. Of course, the argument could be made that Milwaukee could be upgraded to be competitive, but then it never had the financial wherewithal in the past to do this, and the competition could have (and was) correspondingly been upgraded to become even that much more efficient than the Milwaukee. The Milwaukee faster: No Way.
.
The Milwaukee was often touted as being the shortest route from Chicago to the Pacific Northwest. These are the actual mileages:
Chicago to Seattle:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wenatchee 2181
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Wenatchee 2177
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wishram, Centralia 2400
BN, via Galesburg, Louisville, Ravenna, Sheridan, St. Regis, Wenatchee 2345
BN, via Galesburg, Louisville, Ravenna, Sheridan, St. Regis, Wishram 2568
MILW, via Malden 2178
C&NW/UP via Boone, Blair, North Platte, Kemmerer, Kuna, Hood River 2421
Chicago to Tacoma:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wenatchee, Seattle 2221
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Wenatchee 2217
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Ritzville, Vancouver, WA 2361
MILW via Malden 2207
C&NW/UP via Boone, Blair, Kuna 2381
Chicago to Portland:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Ritzville, Wishram 2234
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Ritzville, Wishram 2230
MILW, via Malden, Tacoma, Maytown 2361
C&NW/UP, via Boone, Blair, Kuna 2237
.
The Milwaukee is shorter between some points, but the difference is minimal, especially considering its slower route due to infrastructure inadequacies and grade. The Milwaukee had a profile much worse than BN or UP.
Back in the 1990s, as an example, BN was running pretty standard 7,000-ton stack trains out of Seattle and Tacoma. The standard operation with regard to locomotive power was six SD40s (SD40s were still the workhorses back then) from Tacoma or Seattle to Wenatchee over the 2.2 percent grade of Stevens Pass, where three units would be cut. The train would continue to Essex, Montana where a two unit SD40 helper would be added for the 1.8 percent climb to Marias Pass, then the original three SD40s would take the train to Havre, where yet another unit could be cut and the train could continue to Chicago with 2 units. Another minimum power scenario was when BN was short of power in Seattle or Tacoma, it simply assigned three SD40s to a track train, ran it south to Vancouver, Washington, then east along the Columbia River to Pasco, then to Spokane to rejoin the "regular" route, avoiding the extra power over the Cascades altogether.
Contrast that actual scenario with what the Milwaukee would have had to do, again using the common denominator of an SD40 as locomotive power. The Milwaukee's grade eastbound over the Cacades was 1.74 percent versus 2.2 for the BN, so they could have run a similar train with only five SD40s. But they also would have no choice for routing. Unlike the BN that had the water-level Columbia River route requiring much less power, the Milwaukee would have no choice but to lug everything over the Cascades. And the Milwaukee couldn't have cut power once the train was over the Cascades like BN did because they had another immediate 1.6 percent grade east of Kittitas to Boylston (Saddle Mountains). But even then they would not likely have cut any of their initially-assigned five SD40s because their worse grade was yet to come, the 1.7 percent (but due to curvature, more challenging than Snoqualmie) climb over St. Paul Pass east of Avery, Idaho. And, then beyond St. Paul Pass, that much power would still necessary for the 1.66 percent grade to crest the Continental Divide east of Butte. Once that was accomplished, certainly one would think that the oft-touted "superior" route of the Milwaukee would allow power to be reduced to that of the BN route, but such would not be the case. At least three units would be required to lift the train from Lombard to Loweth, nearly 50 miles of continuous 1 percent grade. And still, even east of Harlowton, three SD40s would be needed all the way to Rhame, North Dakota to ascend the 1 percent climb out of the Little Missouri River Valley. (In Summary, the maximum grade on BN from Havre to Minneapolis = .6 percent; the MILW Harlowton to Minneapolis = 1 percent). Any way you look at it, more locomotives and more cost be it more locomotives for the entire trip, or more locomotives (and crews) at helper terminals in places like Beverly, Avery, and Butte. For a westward trip, the Milwaukee's route was even more inferior.
So, when someone says something like, "the Milwaukee would have had some great advantages over the other roads," I would ask: We know that any mileage advantage would be more than minimalized by their capacity inadequacies, and we know that moving trains via the Milwaukee would take much more fuel, crews, and locomotives. What WERE the advantages?
There were none, and that's why it doesn't exist today.
.
When "SGB" says "it's (its) faster route (referencing the Milwaukee) would have been hard to beat," one really has to wonder, as there has never been any proof of this, but it is an oft-touted myth of Milwaukee superiority (again, please ask yourself if the route really was superior, why didn't someone snatch it up?).
.
During 1973, the timeframe when the Milwaukee was said to be the most competitive with BN, an Official Guide shows Milwaukee train 261(the hottest westbound) making the run from Chicago to Seattle in 59 hours. A connection provided service from Chicago to Portland in 74 hours. Meanwhile in the same Official Guide, BN 97 offers Chicago-Seattle service in 51.5 hours, some 7.5 hours faster than Milwaukee 261, and train 197 shows a Chicago-Portland timing of 56.5 hours. At the same time, however, BN was running the TOFC “Pacific Zip” (successor to the Fast Mail/Western Star) on a schedule that routinely made running time similar to that of the “Empire Builder” passenger train (from Chicago to Seattle) in the vicinity of 45 hours, that much faster than the Milwaukee.
There is also evidence that the Milwaukee’s much-touted Pacific Northwest service really didn’t run as advertised. In August 1972, train 261 was carded for 66 hours from Chicago to Tacoma, but its average running time was 72 hours; train 262 going the opposite way was allowed 73 hours, but averaged 85.5.(http://milwaukeeroadarchives.com/EconomicStudies/1972AveragePerformanceNo261.pdf)
There is little reason to believe the Milwaukee could ever be faster handling stack trains. In 1972, over 90 percent of BN's "transcontinental" route was CTC or double track; The Milwaukee had no double track west of the Twin Cities, and what little CTC there was was “poor man’s CTC” in that there were no power switches. The Milwaukee main line between Plummer, Idaho and Marengo, Washington wasn’t ever even equipped with Automatic Block Signals – a shocking omission on a “mainline” railroad. In 1972, most sidings on the BN "transcontinental" route could handle 7,000-foot trains (as these stack trains would turn out to be); the Milwaukee had few and only four such locations between St. Maries, Idaho and Seattle/Tacoma. By the end, the Milwaukee Western Extension was what it always was, a long branch line without power switches, trackside equipment detectors, and a mostly train-order operation, with signaling and siding capacity incapable to handling the larger trains of the future. This is in contrast to the BN with most sidings already able to handle train sizes of today, and mostly CTC or double track. Of course, the argument could be made that Milwaukee could be upgraded to be competitive, but then it never had the financial wherewithal in the past to do this, and the competition could have (and was) correspondingly been upgraded to become even that much more efficient than the Milwaukee. The Milwaukee faster: No Way.
.
The Milwaukee was often touted as being the shortest route from Chicago to the Pacific Northwest. These are the actual mileages:
Chicago to Seattle:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wenatchee 2181
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Wenatchee 2177
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wishram, Centralia 2400
BN, via Galesburg, Louisville, Ravenna, Sheridan, St. Regis, Wenatchee 2345
BN, via Galesburg, Louisville, Ravenna, Sheridan, St. Regis, Wishram 2568
MILW, via Malden 2178
C&NW/UP via Boone, Blair, North Platte, Kemmerer, Kuna, Hood River 2421
Chicago to Tacoma:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Wenatchee, Seattle 2221
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Wenatchee 2217
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Ritzville, Vancouver, WA 2361
MILW via Malden 2207
C&NW/UP via Boone, Blair, Kuna 2381
Chicago to Portland:
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Casselton, Havre, Ritzville, Wishram 2234
BN, via Oregon, Anoka, Prosper, Havre, Ritzville, Wishram 2230
MILW, via Malden, Tacoma, Maytown 2361
C&NW/UP, via Boone, Blair, Kuna 2237
.
The Milwaukee is shorter between some points, but the difference is minimal, especially considering its slower route due to infrastructure inadequacies and grade. The Milwaukee had a profile much worse than BN or UP.
Back in the 1990s, as an example, BN was running pretty standard 7,000-ton stack trains out of Seattle and Tacoma. The standard operation with regard to locomotive power was six SD40s (SD40s were still the workhorses back then) from Tacoma or Seattle to Wenatchee over the 2.2 percent grade of Stevens Pass, where three units would be cut. The train would continue to Essex, Montana where a two unit SD40 helper would be added for the 1.8 percent climb to Marias Pass, then the original three SD40s would take the train to Havre, where yet another unit could be cut and the train could continue to Chicago with 2 units. Another minimum power scenario was when BN was short of power in Seattle or Tacoma, it simply assigned three SD40s to a track train, ran it south to Vancouver, Washington, then east along the Columbia River to Pasco, then to Spokane to rejoin the "regular" route, avoiding the extra power over the Cascades altogether.
Contrast that actual scenario with what the Milwaukee would have had to do, again using the common denominator of an SD40 as locomotive power. The Milwaukee's grade eastbound over the Cacades was 1.74 percent versus 2.2 for the BN, so they could have run a similar train with only five SD40s. But they also would have no choice for routing. Unlike the BN that had the water-level Columbia River route requiring much less power, the Milwaukee would have no choice but to lug everything over the Cascades. And the Milwaukee couldn't have cut power once the train was over the Cascades like BN did because they had another immediate 1.6 percent grade east of Kittitas to Boylston (Saddle Mountains). But even then they would not likely have cut any of their initially-assigned five SD40s because their worse grade was yet to come, the 1.7 percent (but due to curvature, more challenging than Snoqualmie) climb over St. Paul Pass east of Avery, Idaho. And, then beyond St. Paul Pass, that much power would still necessary for the 1.66 percent grade to crest the Continental Divide east of Butte. Once that was accomplished, certainly one would think that the oft-touted "superior" route of the Milwaukee would allow power to be reduced to that of the BN route, but such would not be the case. At least three units would be required to lift the train from Lombard to Loweth, nearly 50 miles of continuous 1 percent grade. And still, even east of Harlowton, three SD40s would be needed all the way to Rhame, North Dakota to ascend the 1 percent climb out of the Little Missouri River Valley. (In Summary, the maximum grade on BN from Havre to Minneapolis = .6 percent; the MILW Harlowton to Minneapolis = 1 percent). Any way you look at it, more locomotives and more cost be it more locomotives for the entire trip, or more locomotives (and crews) at helper terminals in places like Beverly, Avery, and Butte. For a westward trip, the Milwaukee's route was even more inferior.
So, when someone says something like, "the Milwaukee would have had some great advantages over the other roads," I would ask: We know that any mileage advantage would be more than minimalized by their capacity inadequacies, and we know that moving trains via the Milwaukee would take much more fuel, crews, and locomotives. What WERE the advantages?
There were none, and that's why it doesn't exist today.
