Mark M. writes: "There indeed might be enough business to 'support three transcon railroads' across the Northern Tier, but why have them if they’re all not necessary?"

Three answers: (1) Not all territories are served by all three railroads. This results in monopoly power in certain areas. Nowadays, grain shipped from Shelby, MT to PNW export terminals gets the same rate as grain shipped from Alliance, NE to PNW export terminals. That's great for BNSF but it's terrible for Montana grain growers. (The rate out of Alliance would be higher except for the fact that farmers have the option to truck their grain down to the UP at Kimball.) (2) More carriers opens the opportunity for more innovation. This applies to both operating side and the marketing side (probably the marketing side is the most important in this regard). On the operating side, in particular, American RRs are ignorant about RR electrification and electrified operations. If it ever happens at all, main-line electrification will be much more expensive and much more inefficiently operated than it could be while the industry and its suppliers struggle to move up the learning curve. GE sorely wanted to keep the Milw electrification alive in order to educate the other western roads. While Milw management was hardly brilliant, it did pioneer marketing initiatives that UP and BN should have done but didn't, e.g., short-haul, flexible WAM log unit trains for Weyerhaeuser, early containerization of intermodal shipments, early high-wide clearances, etc. (3) It is risky to have a small number of routes. What happens if there is some disaster between Spokane and Sandpoint?

As for differences in grade, whether they are "minor" or not misses my point. In the overall economics of transcon railroading, they are not enough to turn a profit into a loss. In that sense, I consider them minor. Sure, one line will have the best profile and therefore may enjoy a higher margin than its competitors. But that by itself is not nearly enough to gaurantee it will be the one with the largest profit.

Yes, UP has a far superior route to Rio Grande, but that did not stop Rio Grande from being a profitable carrier.

Correction: The grade from Harlowton to Loweth was reduced from 2% to 1.4% in 1956.

Mark M. also writes: "Again, one wonders why something so obviously beneficial wasn’t done." I have no idea what the "again" is about. As to why the offers to renovate the electrification were not accepted, perhaps my explanation was not understood. Perhaps I did not make myself clear. So let me try again. The Milwaukee Road in total, was a hopeless enterprise. It could not make money. Unless it could be broken up, any investment in Lines West, even a very positive ROI one, was futile. As I explained, disinvestment at Milwaukee Road can be traced back to 1956. The great irony is that Lines West contributed a very positive cash flow right up until a year before the end. As they say, "You could look it up."

I do not buy the assertion that other railroads need to be electrified to justify one railroad being electrified. That the Milwaukee ran for decades with impressively low operating costs while the neighboring roads were not electrified is rather obvious evidence to the contrary.

Milwaukee management up to the GM level readily admit that, based on the economic studies, revitalizing the electrification came out ahead, ASSUMING the track was well-maintained and brought up to modern standards so that traffic levels would remain strong. Of course, that assumption was incorrect, so the electrification had to die along with the rest of the railroad.

Best regards,

Rob L.