BOB2 Wrote:
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> By your logic it's okay for us to kill and injure
> a few passengers, and have a millions in property
> damage, because we have passenger trains operating
> at that speed, flying blind, as just occurred?

Well, I've read your posts and can't make heads or tails of whatever it is you are trying to say.

Of course it's not okay when people die in accidents but you seem to be implying that signal systems are some sort of panacea and accidents never happen when they are being used. Then you cite the El Monte disaster which, of course was not only not prevented by a signal system, but caused by a design flaw in one that was accidentally exploited by a human.

You cannot eliminate all accidents, regardless of the operating method. Running in dark territory is not "flying blind" as you keep stating. Your authority to be there is provided by directive from the dispatcher only after he/she is confident that certain conditions have been met. Sure, you have to trust that your fellow trainman did his job and closed that switch, or reported clear of his limits when he actually was clear, and reported his correct location, and that the dispatcher is being equally vigilant, but professional railroaders do this day after day, year after year, on lighter density lines, and accidents are no more common in those districts then they are in signalled territory.

I'm beginning to think you've never actually run in non-signalled territory using paper authority. If you had, you wouldn't be so hysterical about it and refer to it as "flying blind". SP used to use DTC, which I have operated under as well. It was a good system, as is track warrant control. There will always be a "fly in the ointment" no matter where you run, or what authority you run under. You can't eliminate all the risk.

I feel horrible that we lost two brothers three days ago. I can't even imagine the disorientation and terror they felt before and during the collision. Working a lot in dark territory myself, I also can't understand how a conductor can report normalizing and locking a mainline switch when he clearly didn't normalize it at all. But I also know that stuff happens, both in dark and signalled territory, and some risk comes with the job. Always has, always will.

I'm sure that now that everyone knows WHAT happened, they will now be looking at why. I wouldn't be surprised to find out that there were contributing factors stemming from the EHH aftermath, a gutted, dejected, exhausted, and fractured transportation department, and pressure from above to keep things moving no matter what.

CSX's safety culture has been eroding since EHH started his BS "precision railroading" mandate. From the conductor in Nashville losing his arm last April, to the conductor and student conductor killed in Philadelphia last June, and now this disaster. Sadly, safety cultures improve very slowly on the railroad, generally at a rate of one funeral at a time. No fancy signal system is going to change that.