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Re: Blame the Employees
Author: OPRRMS
Date: 12-06-2008 - 14:50
John Bruce Wrote:
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> Let's assume the computer was malfunctioning: the
> rules would have said Sanchez should contact the
> dispatcher. He didn't.
Wait! What? Which computer are you talking about?
> Even assuming the
> computer taking over and driving the train up the
> line, the dispatcher would have had some chance to
> alert the UP freight and at least get it to stop,
> mitigating the force of the impact. Didn't
> happen. The theory that the computer was doing it
> goes only as far as Sanchez wouldn't have noticed
> anyhow, because he was texting. (And let's face
> it, wouldn't the average dude have a kitten at
> minimum if he's on a locomotive, wants to stop at
> a red, and HAL the computer won't let him??? Not
> Sanchez. . .)
Where did you come up with the idea of a "computer taking over and driving the train?" Only happens in a Hollywood movie, my friend. Or was that sarcasm again?
> Now Conductor Hillenbrand: the rules said the
> engineer calls all signals to the conductor over
> the radio; the conductor replies to indications
> less than clear. It's understood that no signal
> call took place for the flashing yellow, the
> yellow, or the red at CP Topanga. This is just
> fine with Hillenbrand. If he'd contacted Sanchez
> after the departure from Chatsworth -- er, Bob,
> how bout the indication at CP Topanga? -- the
> crash could well have been averted.
Yes! Exactly! But he didn't, so it's a moot point.
> But on another forum it was acknowledged that the
> crews had generally dropped this whole bother of
> calling signals. This was essentially confirmed
> when Veolia sent an internal memo right after the
> Chatsworth tragedy saying c'mon guys, we actually
> mean it when we say you should call signals --
> this is REALLY IMPORTANT. This as good as says
> the supervisors knew of the problem but hadn't
> addressed it.
Didn't seem to make any difference though, did it (referring to the CP Lilac incident last month)?
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> Let's assume the computer was malfunctioning: the
> rules would have said Sanchez should contact the
> dispatcher. He didn't.
Wait! What? Which computer are you talking about?
> Even assuming the
> computer taking over and driving the train up the
> line, the dispatcher would have had some chance to
> alert the UP freight and at least get it to stop,
> mitigating the force of the impact. Didn't
> happen. The theory that the computer was doing it
> goes only as far as Sanchez wouldn't have noticed
> anyhow, because he was texting. (And let's face
> it, wouldn't the average dude have a kitten at
> minimum if he's on a locomotive, wants to stop at
> a red, and HAL the computer won't let him??? Not
> Sanchez. . .)
Where did you come up with the idea of a "computer taking over and driving the train?" Only happens in a Hollywood movie, my friend. Or was that sarcasm again?
> Now Conductor Hillenbrand: the rules said the
> engineer calls all signals to the conductor over
> the radio; the conductor replies to indications
> less than clear. It's understood that no signal
> call took place for the flashing yellow, the
> yellow, or the red at CP Topanga. This is just
> fine with Hillenbrand. If he'd contacted Sanchez
> after the departure from Chatsworth -- er, Bob,
> how bout the indication at CP Topanga? -- the
> crash could well have been averted.
Yes! Exactly! But he didn't, so it's a moot point.
> But on another forum it was acknowledged that the
> crews had generally dropped this whole bother of
> calling signals. This was essentially confirmed
> when Veolia sent an internal memo right after the
> Chatsworth tragedy saying c'mon guys, we actually
> mean it when we say you should call signals --
> this is REALLY IMPORTANT. This as good as says
> the supervisors knew of the problem but hadn't
> addressed it.
Didn't seem to make any difference though, did it (referring to the CP Lilac incident last month)?
