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Re: Blame the Employees
Author: OPRRMS
Date: 12-06-2008 - 18:36
John Bruce Wrote:
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> OPRRMS, I'm fully aware there isn't a computer
> that "drives" the train, but cajon and Extra Board
> have been pushing the idea that there is, and it
> was this computer's fault, not Sanchez. I was
> referring to this.
Oh, I now I get it. Blame someone else.
> I've also been making the point for days that,
> while calling signals doesn't always help -- no
> rule solves everything in every situation, does
> it? Nevertheless, calling signals, or the
> expectation of calling signals, would have helped
> at CP Topanga. In several ways. If Sanchez had
> known he'd been expected to call the signal at
> Topanga -- which he didn't -- but if he'd called
> it, he might have noticed it was red and stopped
> texting. Just maybe. But if Hillenbrand, the
> conductor, had expected a call at Topanga -- he
> was qualified on the route and should have -- and
> didn't hear it, well, then, he could have
> contacted Sanchez and maybe woken the guy up
> before the trains collided.
Didn't help at CP Lilac, did it.
> It's kinda dense to say this is moot because it
> wasn't done.
Collisions happen even if signals are called.
> It appears there was a general
> culture at Veolia, in which we may assume
> supervisors participated, of ignoring rule
> violations.
A "general culture," you say. How did you arrive at that assumption?
> Even at Lilac, the conductor ignored the rule --
> after hearing the yellow called -- that the
> engineer had to slow imediately to 40.
Well, the rule change was emailed to me the same day this incident happened. If it was issued after the crew assumed duty, it wouldn't apply to them.
> Again,
> live and let live, huh?
Not really. The crew is subject to SCRRA's discipline process under the Railway Labor Act, and the engineer faces having his FRA license suspended. What else would you like done?
-------------------------------------------------------
> OPRRMS, I'm fully aware there isn't a computer
> that "drives" the train, but cajon and Extra Board
> have been pushing the idea that there is, and it
> was this computer's fault, not Sanchez. I was
> referring to this.
Oh, I now I get it. Blame someone else.
> I've also been making the point for days that,
> while calling signals doesn't always help -- no
> rule solves everything in every situation, does
> it? Nevertheless, calling signals, or the
> expectation of calling signals, would have helped
> at CP Topanga. In several ways. If Sanchez had
> known he'd been expected to call the signal at
> Topanga -- which he didn't -- but if he'd called
> it, he might have noticed it was red and stopped
> texting. Just maybe. But if Hillenbrand, the
> conductor, had expected a call at Topanga -- he
> was qualified on the route and should have -- and
> didn't hear it, well, then, he could have
> contacted Sanchez and maybe woken the guy up
> before the trains collided.
Didn't help at CP Lilac, did it.
> It's kinda dense to say this is moot because it
> wasn't done.
Collisions happen even if signals are called.
> It appears there was a general
> culture at Veolia, in which we may assume
> supervisors participated, of ignoring rule
> violations.
A "general culture," you say. How did you arrive at that assumption?
> Even at Lilac, the conductor ignored the rule --
> after hearing the yellow called -- that the
> engineer had to slow imediately to 40.
Well, the rule change was emailed to me the same day this incident happened. If it was issued after the crew assumed duty, it wouldn't apply to them.
> Again,
> live and let live, huh?
Not really. The crew is subject to SCRRA's discipline process under the Railway Labor Act, and the engineer faces having his FRA license suspended. What else would you like done?
